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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN F. HAWKINS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
HELEN H. AULEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10'26'5

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENTOFTHENATUREOFTHECASE
This is :an action for property damage arising
from an intersection collision at the intersection of
Tremont Street and First South in Tremonton, Utah.
DrSPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Honorruble Lewis Jones on the morning of the
tri'al disqualified himself and this case was heard,
pursuant to stipula!tion by the Honorable VeNoy
Christoffersen, Judge of The City Court of Brigham City, Utah. Sitting without a jury, Judge
Christoffersen made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law in favor of the driver making a left
turn in front of the oncoming driver and judgment
was made and entered in :fiavor of the plaintiff in
the sum of $181.93.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Helen H. Allen, the appellant, wants the judgment in the lower court reversed and judgment of
''No Cause of Action" entered in her favor.
STATEMENT OF MATE'RIAL FACTS
This accident happened on May 4, 1963 in broad
daylight (TR 13) at the intersection of Tremont
Street and First South in Tremonton, UtJah ('TR 9).
The accident occurred at an open intersection and
there were no traffic signs present at the time of
the accident (TR 10). Mr. Hawkins sa:id he did
not observe the danger of a collision (TR 10) until
the Allen car was three or four feet from colliding
with h'is car. (TR 10) At the precise moment of
the impact, Mr. Hawkins was driving out of the
'left turn made in front of the oncoming Allen car
(TR 2). Mr. Hawkins testified that the speed of
the Allen vehicle at the time of the collision was
10 to 1'2 miles an hour ('TR 6) , and that he also
at the ti'me of the accident was go'ing 10 or 12
miles an hour (TR 9) .
Before entering the intersection, Mr. Hawkins
testified he saw Mrs. Allen's car parked in front
of the post office some 25 or 26 steps south of the
corner where the turn was made (TR 2). Mr.
Hawkins judged his car was approximately 125
feet from the Allen car when he first observed it.
Mr. Hawkins testified that he had no vision
head-on in his right eye at the time of the accident
(TR 11).
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There is a curb on the east side of Tremont
Street (TR 5) and Mr. Hawkins testified as Mrs.
Allen drove north she was driving along the curb
line ('TR 5). First South has a paved roadway wide
enough for two cars and there is 15 to 18 feet from
the south edge of the roadway to the south side of
First South street (TR 6).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THE FOLLOWING
P ARTI'CULARS:
A.

FAILING TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY
TO 'DRE DEFENDANT.

B.

IN NOT KEEPING A PROPER LOOKOUT.

POINT rI
THE FINDINGS OF FACT FAIL TO SUPPORT A
JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF AS THE LOWER
COURT FAILED TO FIND THE DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENCE AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A

AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFF WAS
CONTRl'BUTORY NEGLIGENT IN NOT YIELDING
THE RIGHT OF WAY TO THE DEFENDANT.

The collision occurred in an intersection. Section 41-6-8 defines intersection as follows:
"Intersection ( 1) The area embraced
U'ithin the prolongation or connection of the
3

lateral curblines, or if none, then the lateral
boundary. lin~s. of the road,,-ays of two highways which JOln one another at, or approximately at, right angles, or the area \\ithin
which ,-ehicles traYeling upon different highways joining at any other angle come in conflict." (Emphasis added)
Section -11-6-73, l:tah Code Annotated 1953
reads as follows:
"Yehicle nuning left at intersection - The
driYer of a ,-ehicle within an in:er3€-Ction intending to tlll'n to the left shall yield tI'.e right
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opposite direction
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knows when he is going to turn, and the opposing
driver does not, and in fact, the opposing driver
must discover when and if the turn is going to be
made. In Cederloff vs. Whited (1946) 110 U. 45,
169 P. 2d, 777, where the testimony showed the
plaintiff was driving north on State Street in Salt
Lake City in the center northbound lane and that
the defendant was driving south at a point 200
feet north of Ninth South, and where then the defendant turned his car left directly in the path of
the plaintiff's vehicle and the two collided a few
feet east of the centerline at a time when the oncoming vehicle was going only 25 to 30 miles an
hour, this court granted a new trial, saying the defendant in making a left turn solely and proximately
caused the collision.
In French vs. Utah Oil Company (1950) 117
U. 406, 260 P. 2d, 1002, where a directed verdict
against the driver making a left turn was affirmed,
and where prior to the time of the collision, the leftturning plaintiff admitted he saw the defendant's
truck 120 feet away, this court said:
"Plaintiff elected to turn the risk of clearing
the intersection ahead of the oncoming truck
which was so close that even though it was
moving at a reasonable rate a speed, a collision could not be avoided. In doing so, he met
his own mishap and his negligence contributed
to his injury and prohibits his recovery."
In Walker vs. Peterson (1954) 3 U. 2d 54, 278
P. 2d, 291, this court affirmed a finding that the
5

driver making the left turn was negligent in failing
to yield -the right of way.
'The evidence most favorable to the respondent,
Mr. Hawkins, shows that from where the respondent claimed he saw the appellant's vehicle stopped
at the curb, the appellant's vehicle traveled some 60
to 75 feet to reach the point of impact, and the
respondent admits at the time of the impact, Mrs.
.A:llen's vehicle was going only 10 to 12 miles per
hour. At 10 miles an hour, you're traveling 14.7
feet per second, and a;t 12 miles an hour, 18 feet
per second. If Mrs. Allen came from a stop as Mr.
Hawkins testimony states, then her average speed
based on his testimony from the place where she
stopped, would have been 5 or 6 miles an hour, and
at 6 miles an hour, you are merely going 9 feet per
second.
As Mr. Hawkins was not slowing, his averiage
speed had to be something in excess of the 10 or 12
miles per hour he was going at the time of the
impact. In the decision on the Motion for New Trial
(R 26), the lower court said the plaintiff had completed the left turn and was proceeding in an easterly direction from the intersection at the time of the
collision. The decision on the Motion for a New
Trial recognizes that there is a curbline along the
east side of Tremont Street. As a matter of law
the defendant's vehicle was approaching the intersection at the time the plaintiff commenced the left
turn as it would appear to Mrs. Allen over twice
6

as long to reach the point of impact from the place
where she allegedly stopped as it would have Mr.
Hawkins.
It is submitted that the lower court made Findings of Fact and reached the conclusions it did because it did not consider the statutory definition
of an intersection. It is believed that erroneously
the lower court assumed the collision did not occur
within an intersection as it assumed the intersection
was bounded by the edge of the roadway and not
by the curbline. If we accept the theory that
the east edge of the roadway of Tremont Street
constituted the east edge of the intersection, then
it's possible to undertand how the lower court found
Mrs. Allen was not a pp roaching the intersection,
1and that at the time the collision occurred, the
Hawkin's oar was proceeding east from the intersection. If, however, we accept the sta:tutory
definition as set forth in Section 41-6-8, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, that the intersection embraces the
area within the prolongations of the lateral curblines, then you must find Mr. Hawkins who had
made a left turn to go east in front of an oncoming
northbound car, as a matter of law, did not yield
the right of way to a vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction which was within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate
hazard to the safe movement of Mr. Allen's car in
making a left turn.
It is further submitted that there is evidence
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as to the distance plaintiff traveled to reach the
point of impact as he testified as to his speed at the
time of the impact. Further, regardless of the width
of the street involved, the driver making the left
turn has no right to make a left turn when a vehicle
is approaching from the opposite direction which
is within the intersection or so close thereto as to
constitute an immedia:te hazard and that the mere
fact the plaintiff commenced his turn 120 or
150 feet before the impact would not have afforded
the plaintiff the right of way for being in the intersection first.
Unless the statutory definition of intersection
is of no force and effect in Box Elder County, the
plaintiff and respondent Mr. Hawkins, failed to
yield the right of way to the vehicle which was so
close as to constitute an immedi ate hazard at the
time he entered and during the time during which
he was making his left turn.
1

POINT I
B
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFF'S
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS IN FAILING
TO KEE'P A PROPER LOOKOUT.

This accident occurred just after noon in broad
daylight. There were no other cars on the street and
the view of neither driver was obstructed by objects.
However, the record shows the plaintiff and respondent, Mr. Hawkins was blind in the right eye and
8

had no head-on v1s10n in that eye. The evidence
shows that although at the time of the impact it
was observed the speed of Mrs. Allen's vehicle was
only 10 to 12 miles an hour, that nevertheless, the
hazard or danger of !an impact was not noticed by
Mr. Hawkins until the front of the Allen car was
three or four feet from the side of the Hawkin's
vehicle, and then it was noticed only after the passenger in Mr. Hawkin's car called his a:ttention to
the fact that a collision was abount to occur.
In Conklin vs. Walsh (1948) 113 U. 276, 193
P. 2d, 43 7, the court held it was the duty of the
driver on the arterial to keep a proper lookout just
as well as to require the same of the driver entering
the intersection, and that neither driver could excuse his own failure to see the other. In Johnson vs.
Syme (1957) 6 U. 2d 319, 313 P. 2d 468, where
the plain tiff failed to see a vehicle entering the
intersection until ~t was directly in front of her 'at
a distance of 20 to 30 feet away, at a time when
the car entering the intersection was going 10 to
20 miles per hour, a summary judgment in favor of
the defendant was affirmed, and the court said
that in failing to see the decedant's vehicle until she
was 20 or 30 feet from it, she was contributory negligent 'as a matter of law, and that she either looked
and f!ailed to see the obvious, or failed to look at
all, and under the circumstances, either way, she
was negligent as a matter of law.
In this particular case, Mr. Hawkins did not
9

observe the danger of a collision until the side of
his car was three or four feet from the point of impact, and then only after his attention was called
to the danger by a passenger. It can be argued that
Mrs. Johnson in Johnson vs. Syme, supra, was five
times as prudent as Mr. Hawkins, even though she
was held to be contributory negligent as a matter
of law in failing to keep a proper lookout.
POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCUUSIONS
OF LAW FAIL TO SHOW THE LOWER COURT FOUND
THE AOCIDENT IN QUESTION WAS PROXIMATELY
CAUSED iBY THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE.

Said the lawyer, "I'm unhappy because
The decision is full of flaws.
The sound of the judge's voice,
Made it impossible for the defendant to rejoice.
The decision fails to state Proximate Cause.
The lower court made no findings of f'act on
the proposition of whose negligence proximately
caused the collision in question ( R 22).
•1,

The purpose of Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law is to 1aid the appellant court and to
afford the appellant court wi1th a clear understanding as to the basis of the lower court's decisio1; •
(Merrill vs. Merrill (1961) 362 P. 2d 887, 83 Idahr
306).
In Rogge vs. Weaver ( 1962) ____ Alaska ---368, P. 2d 810, the court stated the purpose of the
10

requirement that Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law be made by the trial court is to enable an
appellant cout to aetermine grounds upon which the
tnal court reached it's decis10n, and to enable tht>
defeated party to dete1·mine whether the case presents a quest10n wortny of consideration by the 1appellan t court and to spare the appellant court the
necessity of searching the record in order to supply
f mdings of Fact.
In Harmon vs. Rasmussen (1962) 13 U.2d 4'22,
375 P. 2d 762, where pleadings made an issue on
whether a prescriptive easement for an irrigation
ditch had been required and there was undisputed
evidence that the ditch had been used for 20 years,
a direct finding on that issue was held to be required
and in the absence of the finding, this court reversed the lower court.
1

In the State of New Mexico ex. rel. S. E. Reynolds vs. Board of City Commissioners of County
of Guadalupe (1962) 376 P. 2d, 976, 71 N.M. 194,
the court held Rule 52 (b) required in non-jury cases
for the trial court to make Findings of Fact on material issues.
Rule 52 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
, ~ads as follows:
"52 (b) Amendment. Upon motion of a
party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgmen~t the court ma;y: amend the
judgment accordmgly. The mCYtion .may be
made with a motion for a new trial pur11

SUJant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are.
made in actions tried by the court without
a jury, the ques tion of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party
raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or
has made either a motion to amend them, a
motion for judgment, or 1a motion for a new
trial."
1

Further, Rule 52 ( c) provides that except in
divorce cases, findings of fact and conclusion of law
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact by
default, by consent in writing, filed in the cause,
or by oral consent in open court entered in the
minutes.
The Findings of Fact ( R 22) don't show
whether or not the defendant was negligent in failing to keep a proper l'Ookout or failing to yield the
right of way or in some other particular, nor do
they show a finding as to where in the intersection,
the collision occurred, or if in fact, the court made
a determination on this point.
In effect, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law show the lower court reached a conclusion,
but that it did not make any findings of fact in support thereof. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (R 22) fail to show a single ground upon
which negligence is based, and it is submitted not
having found any ground that it is impossible to
assume what the proximate cause of the action was
12

found to be by the lower court. Because the Finding
of Fact fail to show specific grounds upon which
negligence is determined by the lower court and
also fail to show upon what ground the lower court
determined the defendant's negligence, if any, proximately caused the accident, it is difficult to determine how the case was lost in the lower court. In
fact, if you read the decision on the Motion for a
New Trial ( R 26) , you can conclude that the lower
court found the collision occurred after the plaintiff's vehicle had left the intersection which is directly opposed to the Finding of Fact contained in
the record at R. 22.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Allen is entitled to a Pyrrhic Victory. The
lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND M. BERRY,
- ----- --------------------- --..... --.. ------- .... ------ ........ ---- .. --

- -

Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
1473 South 11th East
Salt Lake City, Utah

I hereby certify that on thi~ -----------: day. of
January, 1965, I mailed two copies ?f th:is Bnef,
by United States mail, postage prepaid, to Joel M.
Allred, Attorney for the Pliaintiff, 15 East 4th South,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
- - ----- - --- -- -- - ------ --- -- -- -- ------ ......... --------------------..
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